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IMPORTED AUTOMOBILES IN THE UNITED STATES: THEIR RISING MARKET 
SHARE AND THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF A PROPOSED IMPORT RESTRICTION 
After two generations of almost unchallenged supremacy, the U.S. auto 
industry has recently faced plummenting sales, rising competition from imports, 
and mounting requirements for capital investment and structural change. This 
has resulted in massive spilling of red ink in the industry's profit and 
loss columns, further financial pressures on the ailing Chrysler Corporation, 
layoffs of nearly 250,000 workers (as of August 4, 1980 in the automotive 
industry alone according to the United Auto Workers Union) and soaring claims 
for unemployment compensation and trade adjustment assistance. 
While the U.S. industry struggles through this period of major structural 
change, foreign automobile manufacturers, in particular those from Japan, - 1/ 
are setting records in sales, production, and profits. During 1979 and 1980, 
sales of imported automobiles reached record highs in the U.S. economy 
both in terms of the number of units sold and their market share. In 1979, 
imports captured 21 percent of the U.S. market and tallied 2.3 million units' 
sold. During the first half of 1980, imports accounted for 27 percent of the 
new car sales with 1.2 million units sold. 
1/ For information on the Japanese auto industry, see U.S. Library 
of congress, Congressional Research Service, Automobiles Imported From 
Japan, Issue Brief 80030, March 12, 1980, periodically updated and U.S. 
General Accounting Office, United States--Japan Trade: Issues and Problems. 
Washington, General Accounting Office 1979, p. 38-58. 
Congress is considering measures to alleviate the situation and~in June - 
1980 passed a concurrent resolution to promote-the competitiveness of the U.S. 
automotive industry in world markets. Other legislative proposals introduced 
into the 96th Congress would assist the industry through (1) restricting imports, 
(2) encouraging foreign producers to locate in the United States, and (3) pro- 
viding incentives for consumers to purchase domestically produced'automobiles. 
On July 31, 1980, a bipartisan "Auto Task Force" was formed in the House to 
focus attention on and seek solutions to the problems of the auto industry. 
On June 12, 1980, the United Auto Workers Union petitioned the International- 
Trade Commission for import relief. .On August 5, the Ford Motor Company sub- 
mitted to the Commission a similiar petition requesting restrictions on ship- 
ments of Japanese-built cars and trucks to the United States. The Commission 
has decided to shorten its investigation by about three weeks and send its 
final report to the President by November 24, 1980. 
On July 8, the President proposed a Federal aid package of nearly $1 billion 
to assist the industry and ease its transition into production of smaller cars. 
This study focuses on import competition in the auto industry and the 
economic impact of proposals to limit such competition through either import 
quotas or agreements with foreign governments (Japan) to restrict automotive 
exports to the United States. 
Section I discusses the major findings of this study. Section I1 examines 
the data on market shares for imports as well as individual automobile manu- 
facturers. It analyzes changes in auto sales since 1973 and examines the factors 
contributing to increased demand for foreign autos. Section I11 provides general 
background on import restrictions along with a list of current proposals to limit 
imports of automobiles. Section IV gives detailed results of macroeconomic 
simulations performed on an econometric model. These simulations estimate the 
impact of limits on auto imports under the fairly restrictive proposal that 
imports be kept to their 1976 level of 1.7 million units and under three 
different assumptions concerning the consumer's willingness to switch from 
imports to larger domestic cars. 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS IN SECTIONS 11, 111 AND IV* 
A. The Demand for Automobiles 
Production and employment in the U. S. automobile &dustry has fallen 
because of several basic factors, only one of which is increased imports. The 
1980 recession, continuing inflation, the rising cost of car ownership, and 
the general downturn in total demand for new passenger cars have also cut deeply 
into domestic automobile sales. 
As detailed in part I1 of this study, though generally increasing over time, 
overall automobile demand has shown considerable cyclical variation. House- 
holds are quick to postpone new car purchases when economic conditions deteriorate. 
Auto demand generally leads the rest of the economy into recession. 
Since 1973, total automobile sales have risen by as much as 17.2 percent 
in 1976 and fallen by as much as 22.6 percent in 1974. The number of units 
sold fell by as much as 2.58 million in 1974 during the worst recession in 
the postwar period but grew by as much as 1.48 million units in 1976 as the 
economy recovered. 
Viewed from this historical perspective, the drop in auto sales during the 
recession in 1980, while very severe, has been neither unique nor abnormally 
deep. Sales during the 1973-75 recession plummented similarly. The major difference 
for domestic auto producers, however, is that during the current recession, 
* By Dick Nanto, Analyst in International Trade and Finance. 
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t h e  t e n a c i t y ' o f  import s a l e s  i n  t h e  f a c e  of  d e c l i n i n g  t o t a l  demand has  meant 
t h a t  domest ic  s a l e s  have f a l l e n  even f a s t e r  t h a n  t o t a l  U.S. sales. 
The demand f o r  imported passenger  c a r s  h a s  r i s e n  from 1.8 m i l l i o n  u n i t s  
i n  1973 t o  2.3 m i l l i o n  u n i t s  i n  1979. While import  c a r  s a l e s  have t r ended  
upward, from y e a r  t o  y e a r  t h e i r  s a l e s  p a t h  h a s  been q u i t e  i r r e g u l a r .  Imports  
reached a  peak i n  1973, dropped ove r  t h e  n e x t  t h r e e  y e a r s ,  and then  i n  1977 
su rpas sed  t h e i r  p r ev ious  peak. I n  1978, import  s a l e s  s t a g n a t e d ,  b u t  t h e y  surged  
i n  1979 and have inc reased  i n  1980. I n c r e a s e s  i n  imjjorts a l s o  have n o t  always 
been a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  dec reases  i n  domest ic  s a l e s .  During t h e  seven y e a r s  sinike 
1973, import  c a r  s a l e s  r o s e  wh i l e  domest ic  c a r  s a l e s  f e l l  i n  on ly  two of t h e  
y e a r s ,  1975 and 1979. I n  1973 and 1977, bo th  import  and domest ic  s a l e s  c l imbed,  
wh i l e  i n  1974 s a l e s  of  bo th  f e l l .  I n  1976 and 1978, import sales f e l l  w h i l e  
domest ic  sales r o s e .  
B. Market Shares  
While t h e  market s h a r e  of  imported passenger  c a r s  h a s  climbed from 
15 pe rcen t  i n  1973 ( a l s o  i n  1974 and 1976) t o  21 pe rcen t  i n  1979, t h e  most 
pronounced jump has  occur red  i n  1980 when t h i s  s h a r e  r o s e  t o  27 pe rcen t .  Most 
of  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  1980, however, c an  be  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  a  s h r i n k i n g  o f  t h e  
t o t a l  new passenger-car  market and n o t  t o  an  i n c r e a s e  i n  s a l e s  of  impor t s .  
Import c a r  s a l e s  r o s e  on ly  50,477 u n i t s  d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of 1980 over  
t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of 1979, wh i l e  t o t a l  c a r  s a l e s  f e l l  by 996,523 u n i t s .  Even 
i f  impor t s  had remained a t  t h e i r  1979 l e v e l ,  t h e  import  market s h a r e  i n  1980 
would s t i l l  have r i s e n  t o  about  26 pe rcen t .  
I n  terms of  i n d i v i d u a l  market s h a r e s ,  Genera l  Motors a t  45.5 percent  
of t h e  new-car s a l e s  s t i l l  dominates t h e  U.S. a u t o  market .  Ford and Chrys l e r ,  
however, a r e  l o s i n g  t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  s h a r e ,  wh i l e  Toyota and Datsun a r e  
e n l a r g i n g  t h e i r s .  S t i l l  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  s a l e s  o f  60,695 u n i t s  by Toyota 
and 45,158 units by Datsun during the first half of 1980 (compared to the 
first half of 1979) does not explain the decrease in sales of 392,218 units 
by Ford and 195,473 units by Chrysler. 
Statistics of imports shares have certain weaknesses when they are applied 
to the automobile market. First, since they are based on units sold instead 
of retail value, they overstate the percentage of the consumer dollar accounted 
for by those manufacturers whose average car price is relatively low (in particular 
those from Japan). Second, they do not indicate the-percentage of the consumer 
dollar going abroad, because about a fifth of the retail price of an imported 
car includes tariffs, dealer markup, internal transportation, and a variety 
of options that are added after the car reaches the United States. Third, 
a market share is a ratio, so it will rise whenever there is a relative increase 
in imports as compared to domestic sales. An import market share will rise, 
for example, if import sales decline less than total sales. It will also rise 
dramatically if total sales fall while import sales remain nearly constant, 
which is precisely what has been happening during 1980. A rapidly rising import 
share does not necessarily imply rapidly rising imports. 
The outlook for automobile sales (according to Data Resources, Inc.) is for 
sluggish recovery with imports continuing to account for about one fourth of the 
unit sales. Total U.S. sales should recover their 1979 level by 1982, but domestic 
auto employment may not completely recover for years to come. The reason is that 
Detroit's new generation of fuel-efficient autos requires fewer workers to assemble, 
partly because of the increased use of robots but also because smaller cars take 
less work to produce. 
C. Macroeconomic Simulations 
Table 1-1 summarizes the major results of the macroeconomic simulations. 
w i t h  r ega rd  t o  consumer response  t o  t h e  import  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  
The s t r o n g  domest ic  product ion  response  s imu la t i on  p r e s e n t s  t h e  most 
f a v o r a b l e  c a s e  f o r  import  c o n t r o l s .  It assumes t h a t  a l l  consumers who would 
be unable  t o  purchase an import because of t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  swi t ch  t o  domest ic  
makes. ~ o m e i t i c a l l ~  produced c a r s  would be  s u b s t i t u t e d  on a  one-for-one b a s i s  
f o r  t h e  reduced impor t s .  
This  s t r o n g  product ion  response i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  same number of consumers 
who would have bought t h e  impor t s  e v e n t u a l l y  buy l a r g e r ,  l e s s  f u e l  e f f i c i e n t  
domestic c a r s .  U.S. manufac turers  s t i l l  f a c e  c a p a c i t y  c o n s t r a i n t s  i n  t h e i r  
modern, s m a l l  c a r  p roduct ion  l i n e s ,  21  s o  n o t  a l l  consumers who would have - 
bought imports  a r e  a b l e  t o  buy a  comparable domest ic  make. Even i f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
purchaser  of  t h e  import succeeds i n  o b t a i n i n g  a  comparable domes t i ca l l y  produced 
a u t o ,  some o t h e r  customer i s  then  bumped up i n t o  t h e  market f o r  a  l a r g e r  U.S. 
produced c a r .  U.S. sma l l  c a r  p roduct ion  i s  n o t  expected t o  meet demand u n t i l  
t h e  1983 model y e a r .  31 - 
Obviously t h i s  s t r o n g  product ion  response  assumption i s  u n r e a l i s t i c ,  because 
c u r r e n t  expe r i ence  w i t h  impor t s  ( such  a s  t h e  Honda C iv i c )  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  many 
consumers a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  queue up and wa i t  f o r  t h e  import t hey  want .  It does ,  
however, set  a n  upper bound on t h e  economic impact t h a t  could  be  expected 
from import c o n t r o l s .  
The moderate domest ic  product ion  response  assumes t h a t  about  h a l f  of  t h e  
customers  unable  t o  purchase a n  import  because of  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  swi t ch  t o  
a  d o m e s t i c a l l y  produced c a r .  
21 I n  1980, some s l a c k  appeared i n  t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  produce some r e a r -  
wheelzdrive r e l a t i v e l y  f u e l  e f f i c i e n t  U .  S. models. 
31 U.S. Congress.  House. Committee on Ways and Means. Subcommittee 
on ~ r a d e .  Auto S i t u a t i o n :  1980. Committee P r i n t .  Gov ' t .  P r i n t .  Of f . ,  
1980, p. 24-25. 
TABLE 1-1. Macroeconomic Impact of Restrictions on Imports of Automobiles, 
Second Half 1980 to 1982. 
Increase Increase in Reduction Reduction 
in Domestic Employment in in Deficit in Federal 
Sales From Transportation in Merchan- Government 
Restriction Equipment Increase Increase dise Trade Budget De- 
(million Manufacturing in Total in Real GNP (billion . ficit (bil- 
Year - units) Industry Employment (%) dollars)' lion dollars) 
Strong Domestic Production Response: 
1980 0.3 12,000 34,000 - 0.2 4.2 1.9 
1981 0.9 49,000 195,000 0.6 9.8 5.6 
1982 1 .O 59,000 264,000 0.6 9.7 6.9 
Moderate Domestic Production Response: 
8,000 28,000 0.2 
24,000 133,000 0.4 
25,000 143 ,000 0.3 
Weak Domestic Production Response: 
1980 0.1 5,000 23,000 0.1 5.1 1.4 
1981 0.1 9,000 72,000 0.2 13.8 2.2 
1982 0.1 7,000 43,000 0.0 15.9 1.3 
Note: Based on a reduction in auto imports of 300,000 units in 1980, 800,000 
units in 1981, and 900,000 units'in 1982. 
The weak domest ic  product ion  response  assumes t h a t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on impor t s  
cause 100,000 customers  per  y e a r  t o  t u r n  t o  domest ic  makes. While low, w i t h  t h e  
sho r t ages  of  s m a l l ,  f u e l  e f f i c i e n t  domest ic  c a r s ,  t h i s  assumption i s  n o t  comple te ly  
u n r e a l i s t i c .  Th i s  c a s e  sets t h e  lower bound on t h e  economic impact o f  import 
c o n t r o l s .  
The l e v e l  of a u t o  import r e s t r i c t i o n  assumed i n  t h e  s i m u l a t i o n s  i s  t h e  
a c t u a l  1976 import l e v e l  o r  1.7 m i l l i o n  u n i t s .  Th i s  cor responds  t o  t h e  quota  
reques ted  by t h e  United Auto Workers' i n  t h e i r  p e t l t i o n  t o  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Trade Commission. It i s  s m a l l e r  t han  t h e  proposed r e s t r i c t i o n  ana lyzed  by 
t h e  Counci l  of Economic Advisers  which would l i m i t  imports  t o  t h e i r  1979 l e v e l  
( 2 % 3  m i l l i o n  u n i t s )  b u t  l a r g e r  t han  t h e  approximately 1 m i l l i o n  u n i t s  i f  impor t s  
were r e s t r i c t e d  t o  10 percent  of  t h e  U.S. market (H.R.  6645). 
The pe r iod  covered i n  t h e  s i m u l a t i o n s  begins  from t h e  second h a l f  of 1980 
and ex tends  through t h e  end of 1982. 
D. Employment E f f e c t s  
A s  shown i n  Table  1.1, i f  impor t s  were l i m i t e d  t o  t h e i r  1976 l e v e l  of 
1 .7  m i l l i o n  u n i t s ,  - 41 domest ic  employment i n  t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  equipment 
manufactur ing i n d u s t r y  would i n c r e a s e  by an  e s t ima ted  5 t o  1 2  thousand persons  
i n  1980, 9  t o  49 thousand persons  i n  1981, and 7 t o  59 thousand persons  i n  
1982. The a c t u a l  i n c r e a s e  would depe,nd on t h e  e x t e n t  of t h e  domest ic  pro- 
d u c t i o n  response .  The f i g u r e s  assume no o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  r e t a l i a t e  by imposing 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on U.S. a u t o  e x p o r t s .  
These e s t i m a t e s  of t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  d i r e c t  employment i n  t h e  a u t o  i n d u s t r y  
and s u p p l i e r s  imply a n  average  of 17 v e h i c l e s  pe r  new employee. Th i s  i s  some- 
41 Imports  f o r  1980 would be 2.1 m i l l i o n  u n i t s ,  because t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  
would-apply o n l y  t o  t h e  second h a l f  of  t h e  y e a r .  
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what conservative, since estimates from the Department of Transportation indicate 
that historicially the U.S. Big Three automakers have averaged 0.072 labor 
years per unit or 12 to 14 vehicles per worker. - 5/ With the reduced labor 
requirements of Detroit's new generation of cars, however, these estimates 
appear to be reasonable. 
The estimated employment effects are important because they show that even 
under the most generous assumptions, t.he largest increase in the auto industry 
and supplier employment that could be generated by-limiting imports to their 
restrictive 1976 level would be around 50,000 jobs. Considering that some 
250,000 workers were reported to'be on indefinite layoff in August 1980, import 
restrictions alone cannot be expected to eliminate or even greatly reduce 
current unemployment in the auto industry. Under the most pessimistic assumptions, 
according to the simulation, employment in the auto industry and its suppliers 
could rise by as few as 9,000 persons. 
Employment in the auto industry is undergoing fundamental change. With 
the increase in gasoline prices, recession, inflation, high interest rates, 
increased uncertainty in society, and the large increases in the price of new 
cars, consumers are simply not buying as many new passenger cars. In addition, 
the new generation of smaller cars is taking fewer worker hours to produce. 
At the end of December 1978, 2.04 million persons were employed in the 
transportation equipment manufacturing industry. Even with import limitations 
and the assumption of a strong production response, simulated employment in 
that industry rises to only 1.85 million persons by 1982 or 195,000 fewer 
5/ The U.S. Department of Labor estimates that in 1976, an increase 
in domestic auto production of $100 million creates 971 jobs. This implies 
about 16 vehicles per job in the auto and related industries. See U.S. 
Congress. House. Committee in Ways and Means. Subcommittee on Trade. 
World Auto Trade: Current Trends and Structural Problems. Hearings. 
March 7, 18, 1980. Washington, U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 1980, p. 306. 
than in 1978. Hence, even under highly restrictive import controls and - 
assumptions most favorable to the domestic industry, the prospects for the 
bulk of the auto workers currently on indefinite layoff being rehired over 
the next two years is bleak. 
With auto imports at the 1976 level, the increase in total U.S. employ- 
ment (assuming no retaliation by trading partners) in the simulations ranges 
from 23 to 34 thousand in 1980, 72 to 195 thousand in 1981, and 43 to 264 
thousand in 1982. Again the actual increase depends on the assumptions made 
about the willingness of the consumer to switch from a foreign to a domestically 
produced car. 
These estimates imply about 2 to 4 vehicles per job created economy wide. 
This is in accord with estimates by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
which indicate that each job in the auto industry supports 2.2 jobs elsewhere 
in the economy. Hence, taking the Department of Transportation's figure of 
12 to 14 vehicles per direct job and using the 2.2 figure for secondary jobs 
created, each 12 to 14 vehicles should generate 3.2 jobs in the whole economy. 
This implies a ratio of about 4 vehicles per worker economy wide. - 6/ 
The simulations produce employment effects that are somewhat greater 
than those expected from the static ratios estimated by BLS. This can be 
attributed to two factors. First, the DRI model takes into account the 
secondary impact of rising income and GNP on further purchases of domestic 
cars. Second, the model assumes that the increase in demand for domestically 
produced automobiles is a net addition to total demand and not merely a 
diversion of consumer demand from the foreign to domestic sector. The later 
assumption is not totally accurate because most dollars spent on imports 
61 In 1976 an average of 3.6 autos generated one job economy wide. (Based 
on u.S. Department of Labor Statistics in U.S. Congress, World Auto Trade, 
o p e  cite, p. 308.) 
eventually find their way back into the U.S. economy through purchases of 
U.S. exports. 
E. Effects on GNP, Trade, Prices, arid Federal Budget Deficit 
The effect of the import restrictions on GNI? varies from an increase of 0.1 
to 0.6 percent, again depending on the willingness of the consumer. to switch to 
a larger domestically produced automobile. As is the case with economy-wide 
employment, however, these results are probably slightly - high because the model 
assumes that the increase in demand for U.S. automobiles is autonomous and those 
dollars would have not been spent in the U.S. economy otherwise. 
A major effect of the import restrictions would be to improve the balance 
in the merchandise trade of the United States. The U . S .  deficit in merchandise 
trade is reduced by about 10 to 15 billion per year in 1981 and 1982. depending 
on the consumer willingness to switch to U.S. cars. The largest gains in net 
merchandise exports come in the simulation assuming a weak domestic praduction 
response, because with GNI? and income rising less, consumers buy fewer imported 
The model, however, could be overestimating the effect on the balance 
of trade, because it assumes the decrease in sales of imports arises because 
of reduced demand and not import restrictions. The demand for small cars 
is considered to be such that a 10 percent reduction in availability is 
accompanied by a 10 percent increase in prices. (Elasticity of demand coefficient 
of -1.) - 7 1  Even if imports were restricted, their price could rise enough 
to compensate for reduced sales, so that improvement in the balance of trade 
could be slight until capacity constraints on domestic small car production 
7 /  Toder, Eric. Trade Policy and the U.S. Automobile Industry, New York: 
praeg;r Publishers, 1978. 
are overcome. 81 - 
Unfortunately, the inflationary impact of auto import restrictions cannot 
be accurately estimated by the macroeconomic simulations. The problem is 
that the DRI model is not structured to account for excess demand for small 
cars that would be generated by import restrictions. It assumes thatrthe 
drop in imported car sales stems from a fall in demand and not import quotas. 
Any price effects in the model, therefore, arise from excess demand economy- 
wide and not within the automobile market. 
~ased-on separately estimated demand elasticities , however, the simulated 
import restrictions could increase smal1,car prices by approximately 16 per- 
cent, large car prices by 0 to 5 percent, and all consumer prices by 0.4 
to 0.6 percentage points. - 91 
A cursory examination of imported car prices in the Washington D.C. 
area during the summer of 1980 and of advertisements in the automobile trade 
publications corroborate these estimates. Many hot selling imports in short 
supply command markup premiums of about 10 percent ($400 to $500). Formal 
import controls would push these premiums up further. 
If imports were restricted, moreover, foreign producers would probably 
stop sending their smallest models to the United States. Because the foreign 
81 Even with no domestic capacity constraints, the elasticity generally 
will not decrease unless domestic manufacturers are willing to underprice 
imports. If import licenses are auctioned, however, the increased profits 
from the higher prices would accrue to the U.S. Government. 
91 These estimates are computed from elasticities used by the President's 
council of Economic Advisers. (See U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization. 
The Effect of Expanding Japanese Automobile Imports on the Domestic economy. 
Hearings. 96th Congress, 2nd Session, April 3, 1980. Washington, Gov't. 
Print. Off., 1980, p. 77-80.) The computations assume no slack in domestic 
small car production, so that a reduction in imports of 31.5 percent in 
1982 causes a 15.75 percent fall in the availability of small cars, since 
imports account for about half of the small car market. 
company would be limited to exporting a certain number of vehicles to the 
U.S. market, it would tend to send the more expensive, higher profit, and 
less-fuel-efficient models. This is merely another way of raising prices. 
The federal budget deficit would also be reduced by between $1.4 and 
$1.9 billion in 1980, $2.2 and $5.6 billion in 1981, and $1.3 and $6.9 billion 
in 1982 depending on the assumption concerning domestic production response. 
This effect is attributable to increased tax receipts and decreased expenditures 
for unemployment insurance benefits. 
Section IV contains more detailed results of the simulations as well as 
the estimated impact on the unemployment rate, net exports, balance of payments, 
state and local government budget deficits, and national demand for energy. 
11. SHIFTING MARKET SHARES IN AUTOMOBILE SALES 1973-1980* 
Since the Model T Ford, automobiles have held a place in American life 
somewhere between football and apple pie. Certainly foreign countries have 
had their versions of cars too, but somehow those autos seemed to be designed 
either for royalty without regard to cost or for commonfolk without regard 
to comfort. 
For many years Detroit seemed content to relegate about 15 percent of the 
U.S. passenger car market to imports. They appeared willing to relinquish the 
following of customers who bought eith'er an expensive Mercedes-Benz which 
was unique or an inexpensive Volkswagen which was parsimonious both in fuel 
usage and in generating producer profits. 
Imported cars, however, have now gained wide acceptance among U.S. 
consumers. In California, where many of the national trends are set, for 
example, imported cars account for about half of all new car sales. 
* By Dick K. Nanto. Analyst in International Trade and Finance. 
Much of the blame forT the current problems in the U.S. automobile industry 
has been placed on these imports. The primary evidence of the increased competition 
from imports has been the rising share of total sales accounted for by imported 
passenger cars. This paper examines this market share to determine the major 
factors behind it~s rise. It also briefly reviews the determinants of demand 
for automobiles and provides data on past sales levels as well as an outlook 
for sales during the remainder of 1980 and for 1981. 
A. Automobile Demand 
The demand for new automobiles has grown substantially over the past 
thirty years, but it has done so with considerable cyclical variability. 
In the short term, in fact, automobile sales have been highly volatile. 
The main reason for this volatility lies in the nature of the product. New 
passenger cars are classified as durable consumer goods (or business investment). 
As such, buyers can often control both when and whether they purchase cars. 
While most households consider an automobile to be a necessity, they can vary 
the number of vehicles they own, their cost, and vintage according to income, 
tastes, expectations, and special needs. 
Automobile demand can be examined from either a general or specific view- 
point. The general or macroeconomic level of demand deals with how many new 
passenger cars are sold in a given time period. The specific or microeconomic 
level of demand considers how particular manufacturers or groups of manufacturers 
are performing within the context of that total demand. 
The overall demand for new automobiles generally depends on both macroeconomic 
(economy-wide) and microeconomic (industry or household) conditions. The relevant 
macroeconomic variables include changes in disposable personal income, the 
rate of unemployment, inflation, interest rates, and general consumer confidence 
and expectations. Microeconomic variables include the price of new automobiles 
compared to other consumer purchases, the availability of consumer credit, 
the cost of operating a vehicle (in particular the price of gasoline), and 
product differences. 
1. Macroeconomic Behavior 
The way in which the various macroeconomic variables and conditions in- 
fluence total automobile demand is mostly self-explanatory. When real disposable 
personal income declines or unemployment rises during a recession, for example, 
consumers will tend to buy fewer new cars. The same holds true when interest 
rates rise or credit is restricted. Expectations also play a key role in 
auto demand. Prior to and during recessions consumers become more uncertain 
about future income. They might even anticipate being laid off, so they shy 
away from purchases of durable consumer goods, such as cars. During the 
past four recessions, for example, the downturn in automobile sales has 
tended to lead the downturn in the economy. - 11/ 
Economy-wide inflation, even if the price of new cars rises no faster 
than the general price level, tends to reduce demand for new cars. Inflation 
raises the cost of production and, therefore, the price of new vehicles but 
no longer affects the cost of production of used vehicles. In times of rapid 
inflation, therefore, used cars (in particular one owned by the prospective 
buyer) become relatively more attractive than new cars, because the cost per 
mile of usage remaining in used cars tends to be less than in new cars whose 
price is rising rapidly. Consumers, therefore, tend either to buy more 
used cars or retain the car they might already have. 
11/ Turley, James E. Automobile Sales in Perspective, Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis review, v. 58, June 1976, p. 14. 
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Inflation during the 1970s also fell more heavily on the cost of car 
ownership than all consumer purchases. By 1980, the cost of car ownership 
had risen 32.3 percent more than general consumer prices (using 1972 
as the base year). In 1979 alone, car-ownership costs rose by 19.1 percent 
and are forecast to rise by 23.7 percent in 1980. 121 -
The effect of varying macroeconomic conditions on the demand for new 
automobiles is illustrated in Table 2-1. The levels of new passenger car 
sales for the years 1973 to 1979 along with annual changes both in the 
level of sales and in percent are shown along with the market share for 
imports and the growth rate of real GNP. Note that the annual percentage 
change in total units sold varied from a high 17.2 percent increase in 1976 
to a 22.6 percent decrease in 1974. The number of units sold fell by as much 
as 2.58 million in 1974 during the worst recession in the postwar period 
but grew by as much as 1.48 million units in 1976 as the economy recovered. 
Viewed from this historical perspective, the drop in auto sales during the 
recession in 1980, while they very severe, was neither unique nor abnormally 
deep. Sales during the 1973-75 recession plummented similarly. - 13/ 
Since sales by domestic manufacturers comprise the bulk of total U.S. 
sales, domestic sales levels have generally moved in parallel to the pattern 
set by total sales. A decline in total sales has always meant a decline 
in domestic sales. At times, the percentage changes in domestic compared 
to total sales have been different, but as shown in Table 2-1, the direction 
of change has been the same. 
12/ Data Resources Incorporated, Review of the U.S. Economy, July 
1980,p. 1.28. 
13/ See Turley, op. cit., for description of similar movements in car -
sales over the past four recessions. 
The demand f o r  imported c a r s ,  however, has  n o t  always t r acked  t o t a l  
U.S. demand. During i975 ,  f o r  example, even though t o t a l  s a l e s  f e l l  by 
2.7 p e r c e n t ,  import  s a l e s  r o s e  by 11.4 percent .  - 141 Conversely,  i n  1976 
and 1978, wh i l e  t o t a l  s a l e s  were r i s i n g ,  import s a l e s  were f a l l i n g .  During 
1979 and through t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of 1980, import s a l e s  have r i s e n  d e s p i t e  t h e  
d e c l i n e  i n  t o t a l  s a l e s .  
141 From t h e  peak t o  t rough of t h e  1969-70 r e c e s s i o n ,  import a u t o  




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  demand f o r  impor ts  h a s  r i s e n  s i n c e  1973, b u t  whether 
t h e i r  rise has  been t h e  primary cause 'of t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  domest ic  c a r  s a l e s  
i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a s c e r t a i n  from t h e  d a t a  i n  Table 2-1. While t h e  t r e n d  i n  import 
s a l e s  has  been upward, from year  t o  year  t h e i r  pa th  has  been q u i t e  i r r e g u l a r .  
Imports  reached a peak i n  1973, dropped over  t h e  next  t h r e e  y e a r s ,  and then 
i n  1977 surpassed tlieir previous  peak. I n  1978, import s a l e s  s t a g n a t e d ,  bu t  
t hey  surged i n  1979. I n c r e a s e s  i n  impor ts  a l s o  have n o t  always been a s s o c i a t e d  
wi th  dec reases  i n  domestic s a l e s .  Of t h e  seven yea'rs covered i n  Table 1, impor ts  
r o s e  wh i l e  domest ic  s a l e s  f e l l  i n  on ly  two of t h e  y e a r s ,  1975 and 1979. I n  1973 
and 1977, bo th  import and domestic s a l e s  climbed, wh i l e  i n  1974 s a l e s  of bo th  
f e l l .  I n  1976 and 1978, import s a l e s  f e l l  wh i l e  domest ic  s a l e s  ro se .  
2 .  Microeconomic Behavior 
The microeconomic a spec t  of automobile  demand concerns t h e  performance 
of p a r t i c u l a r  manufac turers  o r  groups of  manufac turers  i n  terms of t h e i r  
sha re  of t h e  t o t a l  market o r  o t h e r  c r i t e r i a .  This  a s p e c t  i s  t h e  demand f o r  
s p e c i f i c  t ypes  of c a r s  w i t h i n  t h e  t o t a l  automobile  market and i s  determined 
by r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s ,  f u e l  economy, q u a l i t y ,  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  s t y l i n g ,  s a f e t y ,  
a d v e r t i s i n g ,  and o t h e r  f e a t u r e s .  Of major i n t e r e s t  t o  t h i s  s tudy  i s  t h e  
compet i t ion  w i t h i n  t h e  market f o r  automobiles  between domestic and f o r e i g n  
manufac turers .  Recent ly impor ts  appear  t o  have been i n c r e a s i n g  t h e i r  market 
sha re  because of a combination of t h e  microeconomic f a c t o r s  l i s t e d  above. 
R e l a t i v e  f u e l  e f f i c i e n c y  has  d i s t i n c t l y  favored imports .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  gas  
economy can both encourage-and dampen t h e  s a l e s  of new American passenger  c a r s .  
With soa r ing  g a s o l i n e  p r i c e s ,  a new c a r  t h a t  i s  more f u e l  e f f i c i e n t  i s  more 
a t t r a c t i v e  than an o ld  gas  guzz le r .  Obviously, t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  f u e l  economy 
of a new c a r ,  t h e  more t h e  consumer can  reduce h i s  c o s t  o f  o p e r a t i o n  by t r a d i n g  
in his old and buying a new. While most new car buyers are currently switching 
from large, old American cars to smaller more efficient new-~merican cars, 
they can usually achieve even larger reductions in operating costs by moving 
from large American cars to even smaller and more fuel-efficient foreign cars. 
Of course, not all imports have higher gas economy ratings t.han comparable 
U.S. products. In the 20 to 30 miles-per-gallon range, for example, fuel 
economy of domestic autos compares favorably with that of imports. In terms 
of absolute levels of fuel efficiency, however, imsrts command a clear lead. 
In 1980, of the 25 models sold with EPA gas mileage ratings exceeding 30 miles 
per gallon, all were imports. 151 -
The acquisition price relative to alternative makes is also an important 
factor in the consumer's decision. Next to a home, a car is the largest pur- 
chase most consumers ever make. The purchase price of an automobile combines 
with fuel economy to determine total monthly outlays for auto transportation. 
Except for high mileage users, even though a new car might be more fuel efficient, 
the lower fuel cost will probably not completely offset the increased monthly 
payments for the purchase of the new car. The consumer, therefore, looks 
for a combination of fuel efficiency and price in order to minimize his acquisition 
and operating costs. While this has increased the demand for most fuel-efficient 
domestically produced cars, in many cases, it has meant purchasing an import. 
The price of some imports, such as Mercedes and Jaguar, far exceed those 
of domestic autos, but the prices of most imports, in particular those from 
Japan are concentrated at the lower end of the spectrum. In 1980, for example, 
all four models with suggested retail price less than $4,000 were imports. 
Of the 37 models retailing between $4,000 and $5,000, 25 were imports while 
151 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA 1980 Gas Mileage Guide. -
only  12 were domest ics .  Import d e a l e r s ,  however, a r e  o f t e n  r e l u c t a n t  t o  l e t  
t h e  h o t t e s t  s e l l e r s  go o f f  t h e  l o t  without  loading  them w i t h  o p t i o n s  t h a t  
boos t  t h e  s t i c k e r  p r i c e  cons iderably .  - 161 
An examination of D e t r o i t ' s  p r i c i n g  p a t t e r n  over  t h e  p a s t  few y e a r s  
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  i t  does no t  i n t e n d  t o  compete w i t h  impor ts  by g r e a t l y  under- 
p r i c i n g  them. Inexpensive U.S. s m a l l  c a r s  have a l l  bu t  d i sappeared  from 
t h e  market.  I n  f a c t ,  t o d a y ' s  sma l l  c a r s  can  c o s t  more than  b i g  c a r s  t h a t  
a r e  no t  s e l l i n g  w e l l .  - 171 Chrys le r '  s new K-model compact c a r s  (Ar i e s  and 
R e l i a n t ) ,  f o r  example, a r e  scheduled t o  c o s t  about 20 pe rcen t  more than  t h e  
l a r g e r  models they  r e p l a c e  and appear  t o  be  p r i ced  t o  be compe t i t i ve  more 
wi th  General  Motors '  X-cars t han  w i t h  imports .  - 181 
Qua l i t y  and r e l i a b i l i t y  have a l s o  become major concerns of t h e  buying 
pub l i c .  Th i s  heightened awareness stems from t h e  adve r se  p u b l i c i t y  about  and 
r i s i n g  c o s t  of r e p a i r s ,  t h e  t ime l o s s  and inconvenience of a u t o  breakdowns, 
and t h e  a n x i e t y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  d r i v i n g  a  c a r  t h a t  i s  prone t o  mechanical 
f a i l u r e - e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t r a f f i c  on an  expressway. 
I n  t h e  q u a l i t y  of i t s  products ,  t h e  ev idence  from a  v a r i e t y  of  sources  
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t .  D e t r o i t  l a g s  cons ide rab ly  behind imports  from Japan and Germany. 
According t o  a  survey  conducted by Ward's Auto World, even eng inee r s  from 
t h e  U.S. automobile companies cons idered  t h e  b e s t  q u a l i t y  c a r s  i n  t h e  world 
16/  Bohr, P e t e r .  Are Imports Rea l ly  B e t t e r ?  Money, v. 9 ,  August 1980, 
p. 42-49. 
17/ The Year Car P r i c e s  Turned Upside-Down, Consumer Repor ts ,  v. 45, 
~ ~ r i l T 9 8 0 ,  p. 219-20. 
18/ P a s z t o r ,  Andy. C h r y s l e r ' s  'Kt-Cars t o  Cost Over $6,000; Some Versions 
t o  ~ e K i 1  f o r  About $7,000. Wall S t r e e t  J o u r n a l ,  August 12 ,  1980, p. 3 .  
to be produced in Japan. - 19/ "In Germany, the ADAC Motoring Club in an analysis 
of roadside breakdowns it attended in 1979, concluded that the vehicles requiring 
the least assistance were made by Toyota, followed by Honda and Mercedes-Benz. 20/ - 
For reliability, one of the most frequently consulted sources for consumers 
is the magazine, Consumer Reports. Each year the magazine gathers data from 
its readers .on the frequency of repairs for automobiles. Table 2-2 summarizes 
the overall ratings for passenger cars by showing the number of models.falling 
into each repair frequency class. Note that autos prbduced by U.S. manufacturers 
are clustered around frequency of repair ratings of average, but there are a 
considerable number of models scoring worse or much worse than average. Imports 
from Japan and Germany, however, nearly all scored either better or much better 
than average. Particularly noteworthy is that with the exception of one Japanese 
car sold under a Chrysler nameplate, all Japanese cars scored in the much-better- 
than average category. - 21/ 
Whether the quality differences between imports and domestics are real 
or imagined, Detroit may have difficulty convincing the consumer that its 
new generation of small, fuel-efficient cars are equal in quality to the imports 
from Japan and Germany. 
19/ Waddel, Richard and Ervin Maus. U.S. Engineers Rank Imports Tops, 
ward ' s ~ u t o  World, March 1980, p. 48. 
20/ Japanese and German Cars Score High on Reliability, Automotive News, 
July 5, 1980, p. 14. 
21/ Frequency of Repair Records, 1974-1979, Consumer Reports, v. 45, 
~ ~ r i l T 9 8 0 ,  p. 263-72. 
TABLE 2-2. Reliability of Passenger Cars as Measured by Frequency 
of Repair Records. 1979 (or 1978) 
NUMBERS OF MODELS SCORING: 
Much Better Better Worse Much Worse 
MANUFACTURER Than Than Than Than 
Average Average Average . Average Average 
General Motors -- 8 22 8 .  6 
Ford - 4 13 4 3 
Chrysler -- 2 3 3 5 
AMC 1/ - 2 1 1 -- - 
Total Domestics -- 14 40 16 15 - 
Toyota 3 
Datsun (Nissan) 5 
Honda 3 
Other Japan 2/ 6 





Total Sweden/Norway 1 1 1 -- -- 
Total Imports 2 3 6 4 1 1 
Grand Total 2 3 2 0 44 17 16 
1/ Ratings for the Gremlin and Matador were for 1977. - 
21 Includes captive imports sold under Chrysler Corp. nameplates. - 
NOTE: Data excludes pickup trucks, vans and recreational vehicles. 
1978 data were used if 1979 data were unavailable. 
Source: Based on Frequency of Repair Records, 1974-1979, Consumer 
Reports, April 1980, p .  263-272. 
Domest ical ly  produced c a r s  do ,  however, r a t e  h ighe r  t han  imports  i n  some 
r e s p e c t s .  I n  t e s t s  o f  c r a shwor th ines s ,  comfor t ,  a s  w e l l  as i n  c o s t s  o f  scheduled 
maintenance and c o l l i s i o n  r e p a i r s ,  U.S. produced automobiles  g e n e r a l l y  s c o r e  
b e t t e r  t han  impor t s .  The d a t a  compiled by t h e  Highway Loss Data I n s t i t u t e  
bodes p a r t i c u l a r l y  w e l l  f o r ' t h e  new g e n e r a t i o n  of U.S. s m a l l  c a r s .  I t  shows 
t h a t  t h e  1980 c a r s  w i t h  t h e  lowes t  r e l a t i v e  average  l o s s  payment p e r  i n su red  
v e h i c l e  year  were t h e  Buick Skylark ,  Chevrolet  C i t a t i o n ,  and Pon t i ac  Phoenix, 
which a r e  a l l  new X-body c a r s  by General  Motors. The c a r s  w i t h  t h e  h i g h e s t  
r e l a t i v e  average  l o s s  payment per  i n su red  v e h i c l e  yea r  were t h e  Toyota Celica, 
Mazda RX7, and P o n t i a c  F i r e b i r d .  - 22/ 
For t h e  American consumer, however, f u e l  e f f i c i e n c y ,  p r i c e ,  and t h e  
r i s i n g  r e p u t a t i o n  f o r  q u a l i t y  i n  impor t s  appear  t o  have more t h a n  o f f s e t  
t h e  h ighe r  c o s t s  of scheduled maintenance and r e p a i r s  from c o l l i s i o n s  o r  
lower s a f e t y  r a t i n g s .  These f a c t o r s  appear  t o  have converged i n  1979 and 
1980 t o  b o l s t e r  t h e  s a l e s  of imported passenger  c a r s .  
B. Market Shares  
A market s h a r e  o r  market p e n e t r a t i o n  r a t i o  measures t h e  p ropor t i on  of 
t o t a l  sales accounted f o r  by a  sel ler  o r  group of  s e l l e r s .  I n  t h e  new 
passenger  c a r  market ,  t h e  u sua l  measure of  market s h a r e  i s  t h e  percentage  
of  u n i t s  s o l d  ( n o t  t h e  percentage  of  t h e  r e t a i l  s a l e s  d o l l a r s ) .  
22/ Highway Loss Data I n s t i t u t e ,  Automobile Insurance  Losses C o l l i s i o n  
coverages ,  I n i t i a l  R e s u l t s  f o r  1980 Models, Washington, 1980, p. 6 .  U.S. 
Congress.  House. Committee on Ways and Means. Subcommittee on Trade.  
Auto S i t u a t i o n :  1980. Committee P r i n t .  Washington, Gov' t .  P r i n t .  Off . ,  
1980, p .  49-52. 
1. Weaknesses of Market Share Measures 
Market share data in terms of units sold are commonly used because 
they can be collected easily without revealing information about pricing 
strategies or costs of production for particular manufacturers. These data, 
however, have certain weaknesses as estimates of sales shares. One problem 
is that all cars do not cost the same. In 1980, new car prices ranged.from 
a low $3,699 (Honda Civic) and $4,119 (Chevette Scooter) to $22,857 (Cadillac 
Fleetwood) and $36,886 (Mercedes-Benz 450SEL), not to-mention a Rolls Royce. 
The average import does not cost the same as an average domestically produced 
car, so the market share based on units sold will not reflect the true proportion 
of the consumer dollar taken by imports. 
In 1979, for example, the average customs value of an imported car 
at the U.S. port of entry ranged from $4,001 for those from Japan, $6,439 
for those from Germany, $6,574 for those from Sweden, to $6,713 for those 
from the United Kingdom. The average for all imported cars (excluding imports 
from Canada) was $4,716. - 23/ At the retail level, the average imported car 
sold for $6,760, while the average domestic car cost $7,032. 241 -
Table 2-3 provides data on the value of retail sales of new passenger cars 
from 1973 through June 1980. Note that in 1973, 12.6 percent of the dollars 
spent on automobiles went to purchase imported cars. This is 2.8 percentage 
points under the 15.4 market share in Table 2-1 based on the number of units 
sold. The difference between the two measures of market share, however, narrowed 
during the 1970s until by 1979, the two were only 0.7 of a percentage point 
apart. 
23/ Based on U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. General Imports, December 
1979,Washington, U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 1980, p. 2-190. 
24/ Based on unpublished data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. -
The explanation for this narrowing is not that the price of imported 
cars has been rising relative to the price of domestic cars. As of the second 
quarter of 1980, the price index for domestic autos stood at 160.5 while that 
for imported autos was 160.6 (based on 1972-100). Prices for both domestic 
and imported cars have risen at virtually the same rate since 1972. 
A more plausible explanation for this narrowing of the difference between 
the two measures of market share is that the decline in the purchasing power 
of households combined with the soaring price of gasoline has forced consumers 
to buy less expensive, domestically produced cars. This brings the average 
amount spent on a new car into closer range whether it be imported or domestic. 
TABLE 2-3. Value of U.S. Domestic, and Import New Automobile 
Sales With Market Shares, 1973-1980 
Total U.S. Auto 
Sales ( $  million) 67,384 74,243 72,811 65,730 55,502 43,120 39,484 46,700 
Domestic Sales L/ 
( $  million) 49,961 58,563 60,962 55,151 48,087 36,196 33,811 40,825 
Share (%) 74.1 78.9 83.7 83.9 86.6 83.9 85.6 87.4 
Import Sales 
( $  million) 17,423 15,681 11,849 10,579 7,415 6,924 5,673 5,875 
Share (%) 25.9 21.1 16.3. 16.1 13.4 16.1 14.4 12.6 
1/ Seasonally adjusted annual rates, based on data through second quarter, - 
1980. 
21 Includes imports from Canada. - 
Source: Based on U.S. Bureau Economics Analysis, unpublished data. 
Summaries of this data are available in the Survey of Current Business. 
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The market share also overstates the percentage of the consumer's 
automobile-buying dollar that goes abroad. The country exporting to the 
United States receives only the wholesale price of the car. The tariff, 
internal shipping costs, dealer markup, and a variety of options (undercoating, 
paint sealer, rust-proofing, body mouldings, etc.) are performed with U.g. 
labor and usually with U.S. supplies. In 1978, for example, the imported auto 
industry is estimated to have spent $3.694 billion in the United States including 
- 
$2.08 billion in payroll expenses, $627 million for services purchased, $607 
million for taxes, and $380 million for materials and components purchased. - 25/ 
Some of these expenditures, of course, went for servicing, and not selling, 
imported cars. 
In 1979, the retail value of imported cars totaled $15.681 billion, of 
which about $12.058 billion represented the import value of the cars - 26/ 
and $3.623 billion the value added after arriving in the United States. 
The share of the auto sales dollar going abroad in 1979, therefore, was 
approximately 16 percent and not the 21.8 percent one might infer from the 
market share based on units sold. 
In summary, the market share based on units sold tends to overstate 
the percentage of the consumer's automobile dollar spent on imported cars. 
The amount of this overstatement, however, has been narrowing during the 
1970s. The market share also overstates the percentage of the consumer 
dollar going abroad, because about a fifth of the price of the imported 
car represents value added after it entered the United States. 
25/ Harbridge House, Inc. The Imported Automobile Industry, June 1979, -
p. 45. 
26/ $10.982 billion customs valuation for imports in 1979 plus $1.076 
billiG decrease in inventories of imported cars. 
2. Import Market Shares  
With t h e  aforementioned cavea t s  i n  mind, t h e  market s h a r e s  f o r  impor ts ,  
domest ics ,  and i n d i v i d u a l  manufac turers  can  now be examined. A s  shown i n  
Table 2-1, t h e  market s h a r e  f o r  imports  h a s  grown from 15.4 percent  i n  1973, t o  
18.5 pe rcen t  i n  1977, and 21.8 percent  i n  1979. This  s h a r e  has  i nc reased  even 
f u r t h e r  t o  26.9 percent  f o r  t h e  , f i r s t  h a l f  of 1980 ( s e e  Table 2-4). 
Most of t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  market s h a r e  between 1979 and 1980, however, 
can be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  sh r ink ing  of t h e  t o t a l  ney passenger  c a r  market and 
no t  t o  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  s a l e s  of imports .  Import s a l e s  r o s e  only 50,477 u n i t s  
whi le  t o t a l  s a l e s  f e l l  by 966,523 u n i t s .  Even i f  imports  had remained a t  t h e i r  
1979 l e v e l ,  t h e  import market s h a r e  would have r i s e n  t o  about 26 pe rcen t .  
The huge decrease  i n  s a l e s  by domest ic  manufacturers  dur ing  t h e  f i r s t  
h a l f  of 1980 i s  shown i n  Table 2-4. Domestic s a l e s  dropped by 23.6 percent  
(1,047,000 u n i t s )  t o  on ly  3,399,176 u n i t s .  This  r i v a l s  t h e  s e v e r i t y  of t h e  
slump a t  t h e  bottom of  t h e  las t  r e c e s s i o n  ( f i r s t  h a l f  of 1975) when only  
3,260,978 domes t i ca l ly  produced u n i t s  were so ld .  
During t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of 1980, Japan  and France r e g i s t e r e d  t h e  l a r g e s t  
ga ins  i n  s a l e s  and market sha re .  France,  however, s e l l s  s o  few c a r s  i n  t h e  
United S t a t e s  t h a t  i t s  s a l e s  have l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on t h e  e n t i r e  market .  S a l e s  
of imports  from Japan ,  however, r o s e  by 9.6 percent  and accounted f o r  21.7 
percent  of t h e  new passenger  c a r  market.  - 271 
271 The number of v e h i c l e s  imported from Japan dur ing  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  
of 1 9 m  r o s e  31.8 percent  over  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of 1979. Many of t h e s e  v e h i c l e s ,  
however, went t o  b u i l d  i n v e n t o r i e s  and were no t  so ld .  
TABLE 2-4. Number of New Passenger  Cars  Sold ,  Percentage  Changes, 
and Market Shares  i n  t h e  U.S. by Country 
F i r s t  Half 1979 t o  F i r s t  Half 1980 
Jan .  1 t o  J an .  1 t o  Percent  
June 30 June  30 Change 
1980 1979 (%) r 
T o t a l  U.S. S a l e s  
Domestic S a l e s  
Share 












From United Kingdom 11,881 
Share 0.3% 
Source: Based on Automotive News, J u l y  14,  1980. p. 46. 
Table 2-5, shows t h e  u n i t s  so ld  and market s h a r e s  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  manufacturers  
By f a r  General  Motors w i t h  i t s  45.5 percent  market s h a r e  dominates U.S. s a l e s  
of new passengers  c a r s .  GM has  even maintained i t s  market s h a r e  a g a i n s t  impor ts .  
Although i t s  s a l e s  have dec l ined  by 18.4 p e r c e n t ,  t hey  have f a l l e n  about  t h e  
same r a t e  a s  t o t a l  U.S. s a l e s .  
TABLE 2-5. Number of New Passenge i  Cars  Sold,  Percentage Changes, 
and Market Shares  . in  t he  U.S. by Major Producers  
F i r s t  Half 1979 t o  F i r s t  Half 1980 
Jan .  1. t o  Jan .  1 t o  Percent  
J an .  30, , June 30,  Change 
1980 1979 
T o t a l  U.S. S a l e s  ' 
General  Motors: 
Ford Motor: 
Chrys l e r  Corp: 
Toyata : 
Datsun (Nissan) :  
Honda : 
S a l e s  
Share 
S a l e s  
Share 
- 
S a l e s  
Share 
S a l e s  
Share 
S a l e s  
Share 
Sa l e s  
Share 
Vol kswagen (Domestic) 96,194 
(Imports)  43,796 
T o t a l  S a l e s  139,990 
Share 3.0 
Mi t sub i sh i  - 11: S a l e s  81,260 
Share 1 .8  
American Motors: S a l e s  78,788 
Share 1..7 
Mazda (Toyo K ~ ~ ~ O ) :  S a l e s  74,297 
Share 1 6 
Subaru ( F u j i ) :  S a l e s  70,804 
Share 1.5 
Mercedes-Benz: Sa l e s  26,113 
Share 0.6 
- -- -- - - - - 
11 Mi t sub i sh i  c a r s  a r e - s o l d  as "cap t ives"  under Chrys le r  nameplates.  - 
Source: Based on Automotive News, J u l y  14 ,  1980, p .  46. 
The U.S. manufacturers who are experiencing the greatest difficulties are 
Ford'and Chrysler. Ford's sales have declined much faster (-33.4 percent) 
than total U.S. sales, which has resulted in a sharp reduction in Ford's 
market share from 20.8 percent for the first half of 1979 to 16.8 percent 
for the same period in 1980. 
Chrysler, with sales levels about half of Fords, 'reported similar 
declines both in sales volume and market shares so that in the first half 
of 1980, it accounted for only 7.1 percent of the market. Chrysler, however, 
still outsold any foreign company in the U.S. market. 
After the U.S. big three come imports from Japan. Toyota and Datsun 
(Nissan) both command similar market shares of about 6 percent and have 
been experiencing increasing sales. Each sells approximately one fourth 
of its production of automobiles in the United States. 
Honda saw its sales decline during the first half of 1980, not because 
of lack of demand, but because of constraints on output capacity and possibly 
a corporate decision to tread easily in the U.S. market in which it plans to 
begin auto production. 
Since Volkswagen has been shifting its production from Germany to the 
United States, Volkswagen imports have been declining. Total sales in the 
United States, however, are rising, so the company is recovering some of 
the sales lost when its beetle dropped in popularity. 
Among the manufacturers with market shares of less than 2 percent are the 
remaining Japanese producers, American Motors, and the other European producers. 
Mitsubishi cars, sold as Chrysler captive imports such as the Dodge Colt and 
Plymouth Arrow, declined in sales. Since Mitsubishi reportedly plans to begin 
marketing its cars under its own name in the near future, and since Chrysler 
now has small, fuel-efficient cars of its own, Chrysler has not been pushing 
s a l e s  of t h e  Mi t sub i sh i  c a p t i v e  imports .  C h r y s l e r ' s  f i n a n c i a l  t r o u b l e s  
have probably a l s o  hindered s a l e s .  
American Motors has  been holding i t s  own, a l t hough  i t  has  p rev ious ly  l o s t  
much of  i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  market s h a r e  and s t i l l  f a c e s  cons ide rab le  d i f f i c u l t y .  
In  summary, t h e  market sha re  d a t a  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  dur ing  t h e  f i r s t h a l f  
of 1980, GM has  he ld  s t eady  wh i l e  Toyota and Datsun have been i n c r e a s i n g  
t h e i r  s h a r e s  mainly a t  t h e  expense of Ford and Chrys le r .  S t i l l  t h e  i n c r e a s e  
i n  s a l e s  of 60,695 u n i t s  by Toyota and 45,158 u n i t s  by Datsun does not  
exp la in  t h e  decrease  of 392,218 u n i t s  by Ford and 195,473 u n i t s  by Chrys le r .  
While import  compet i t ion  con t inues  t o  e rode  s a l e s  of domest ica l ly  
produced c a r s ,  D e t r o i t  has  been h i t  even harder  by t h e  g a s o l i n e  sho r t age  
i n  1979, t h e  r i s i n g  c o s t  of  ope ra t ing  a  c a r ,  h igh  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  dwindling 
consumer conf idence ,  r i s i n g  unemployment, and a l l  of t h e  o t h e r  nega t ive  in-  
f l u e n c e s  of  t h e  r eces s ion .  Hence, t he  D e t r o i t  bumper s t i c k e r  proclaiming 
t h a t  U.S. au to  unemployment i s  made i n  Japan appears  t o  b,e n o t  a l t o g e t h e r  
a c c u r a t e ,  b u t  t h e  t e n a c i t y  of import s a l e s  i n  t h e  f a c e  of  d e c l i n i n g  demand 
has c e r t a i n l y  no t  helped domestic au to  manufacturers  o r  t h e i r  workers.  
The nex t  s e c t i o n  of t h i s  r e p o r t  add res ses  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  of  how much 
of t he  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  market sha re s  of t h e  manufacturers  can be a t t r i b u t e d  
t o  r i s i n g  s a l e s  and how much i s  due t o  t h e  sh r ink ing  market.  
3. Decomposition of Market Share S h i f t s  
A market s h a r e  i s  determined by d i v i d i n g  t h e  s a l e s  of a  c e r t a i n  manufac turers  
by t h e  t o t a l  market s a l e s .  Hence, market s h a r e s  can i n c r e a s e  e i t h e r  by t h e  
manufac turer ' s  s a l e s  r i s i n g  f a s t e r  than  t o t a l  s a l e s ,  t h e  manufac tu re r ' s  s a l e s  
r i s i n g  whi le  t o t a l  s a l e s  f a l l  ( a s  i s  t h e  c a s e  wi th  Toyota,  Datsun,  Volkswagen, 
American Motors, and Subaru) o r  t h e  manufac turer ' s  s a l e s  f a l l i n g  l e s s  than  
t o t a l  s a l e s  ( a s  i s  t h e  case  wi th  Honda, M i t s u b i s h i ,  Mazda, and Mercedes-Benz). 
Table 2-6 shows the two factors contributing to the increases in market shares 
for passenger cars for the first half of 1980. It divides the increases in the 
market share to that attributable to increased sales by the manufacturer and 
that attributable to decreased total sales. 
Note that for all imports, only 17.5 percent of the rise in the market 
share in 1980 can be attributed to increased sales. The vast majority of 
the increase in the market share for imports stems from the shrinking of 
the total market for autos. 
TABLE 2-6. Sources of Increases in Market Shares for Passenger 
Car Sales, First Half 1979 to First Half 1980 
Attributed to Increased Attributed to Decreased 
Corporate Sales ( 2 )  Total U.S. Sales (%) 
Total Imports 17.5 82.5 
Imports from Japan 32.2 67.8 




Mitsubishi (Chrysler) 1 / 
Mazda -35-7 
Other 
Volkswagen (Include Domestics) 18.1 
American Motors 28.2 71.8 
Mercedes-Benz -92 .6 192.6 
1/ Exceeds - 100 percent - 
2 1  Exceeds + 200 percent - 
NOTE: The following manufacturers had decreasing market shares: General 
Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Fiat, Jaguar, MG, Opel, Porsche, and Triumph. Additional 
manufacturers with increasing market shares include Alfa Romeo, Audi, BMW, 
Lancia, Peugot, Renault, Rover, Saab, and Volvo. 
Source: Based on data in Tables 2-4 and 2-5 using the method in the Mathematical 
Notes to Table 2-6. 
For Toyota and Datsun, however, about  h a l f  of t h e i r  i n c r e a s e  i n  market 
s h a r e  can be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  h ighe r  s a l e s  o r  sharpened compet i t iveness  i n  t h e  
U.S. market.  Volkswagen and American Motors a l s o  i n d i c a t e  i nc reased  com- 
p e t i t i t e n e s s ,  a l b e i t  from a sma l l e r  base.  
S ince  s o  much of t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  market s h a r e s  f o r  impor ts  can  be- 
a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  t o t a l  s a l e s ,  t h e  obvious ques t ion  t o  a s k  
i s  when, i f  e v e r ,  can s a l e s  be expected t o  recover .  
C. Sa l e s  Outlook 
According t o  a f o r e c a s t  by Data Resources Inc . ,  f o r  t h e  remainder of 
1980, a u t o  s a l e s  a r e  expected t o  improve s lowly  and reach  a t o t a l  of 9 m i l l i o n  
u n i t s  (down 15 percent  from 1979).  Domestic s a l e s  a r e  p ro j ec t ed  t o  f a l l  t o  
a low 6.6 m i l l i o n  u n i t s  (down 21 percent )  which w i l l  make 1980 t h e  worst  
s a l e s  year  i n  almost two decades.  Imports a r e  expected t o  r i s e  t o  2.4 
m i l l i o n  u n i t s  (up 3 pe rcen t )  and account  f o r  about 28 percent  of t h e  
u n i t s  s o l d .  28/ -
This  b leak  out look  f o r  domestic and t o t a l  s a l e s  s tems l a r g e l y  from 
normal r e c e s s i o n  e f f e c t s  and sho r t ages  of s m a l l ,  f u e l - e f f i c i e n t  c a r s  produced 
domest ica l ly .  Consumer a t t i t u d e s  have a l s o  d e t e r i o r a t e d .  I n  a r e c e n t  survey  
by the  Un ive r s i t y  of Michigan, 61 percent  of t h e  consumers thought  c o n d i t i o n s  
were unfavorable  f o r  purchasing an  automobile (compared wi th  48 percent  a 
year  e a r l i e r ) .  Although c r e d i t  i s  becoming more a v a i l a b l e  and l e s s  c o s t l y ,  
consumer debt  con t inues  a t  burdensome l e v e l s .  The r e c e s s i o n  con t inues  t o  
reduce purchasing power. The c o s t  of c a r  ownership, meanwhile, con t inues  
t o  r i s e  f a s t e r  than  t h e  gene ra l  p r i c e  l e v e l .  
In 1981, import sales are expected to increase only modestly as Detroit 
puts its new generation of smaller gas efficient cars into full production. 
Total car sales are expected to recover sluggishly and rise to 9.5 million units 
with imports accounting for 26.6 percent or 2.5 million units. 
According to DRI total sales are not expected to recov.er to their J979 
level until 1982. By then, domestic sales should also regain the 8 million 
mark. Even with the recovery in domestic sales, however, auto worker employment 
-. 
may never rebound completely, because the new generation of autos requires 
fewer workers on the assembly line. This is partly because of increased use 
of mechanical robots to enhance quality but also because smaller cars take 
less work to assemble than large cars. 
D. CONCLUSION (Section 11) 
Though generally increasing over time, overall automobile demand has shown 
considerable cyclical variation. Households are quick to postpone new car 
purchases when economic conditions deteriorate. Auto demand generally leads 
the rest of the economy into recession. 
Import cars have become more popular with the U.S. consumer because of 
greater fuel economy, lower acquisition price, and high quality ratings. 
Domestic cars, however, have the advantage in terms of safety, comfort, and 
cost of scheduled maintenance and collision repairs. 
The market share for imported cars has risen from 15.4 percent in 1973 
to 21.8 percent in 1979 and 26.9 percent during the first half of 1980. Most 
of the increase in this share for 1980, however, can be attributed to the 
shrinking of the total new passenger-car market and not to an increase in 
sales of imports. Import car sales rose only 50,477 units over the first 
half of 1979 while total car sales fell by 996,523 units. Even if imports 
had remained a t  t h e i r  1979 l e v e l ,  t h e  import  market s h a r e  would s t i l l  have 
r i s e n  t o  about  26 pe rcen t .  
S t a t i s t i c s  of import s h a r e s  have c e r t a i n  weaknesses when they  a r e  a p p l i e d  
t o  t h e  automobile  market.  F i r s t ,  s i n c e  t hey  a r e  based on u n i t s  s o l d  i n s t e a d  
of r e t a i l  v a l u e ,  t hey  o v e r s t a t e  t h e  percentage  of t h e  consumer do l l a r . accoun ted  
f o r  by t h o s e  manufac turers  whose average  c a r  p r i c e  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  low ( i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  t hose  from Japan) .  Second, t hey  do n o t  i n d i c a t e  t h e  percentage  of 
t h e  consumer d o l l a r  going abroad ,  because about  a  f i f t h  of  t h e  r e t a i l  p r i c e  
of an imported c a r  i nc ludes  t a r i f f s ,  d e a l e r  markup, i n t e r n a l  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  
and a  v a r i e t y  of  o p t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  added a f t e r  t h e  c a r  r eaches  t h e  United S t a t e s .  
Th i rd ,  a market s h a r e  i s  a  r a t i o ,  s o  i t  w i l l  r ise whenever t h e r e  i s  a  r e l a t i v e  
i n c r e a s e  i n  impor t s  a s  compared t o  domest ic  s a l e s .  An import  market s h a r e  
w i l l  r i se ,  f o r  example, i f  import s a l e s  d e c l i n e  l e s s  t han  t o t a l  s a l e s .  It 
w i l l  a l s o  r ise  d r a m a t i c a l l y  i f  t o t a l  sales f a l l  wh i l e  import s a l e s  remain 
n e a r l y  c o n s t a n t ,  which i s  p r e c i s e l y  what ha s  been happening dur ing  1980. A 
r a p i d l y  r i s i n g  import s h a r e  does n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  imply r a p i d l y  r i s i n g  impor t s .  
A s  f a r  a s  i n d i v i d u a l  producers  a r e  concerned,  General  Motors w i th  i t s  45.5 
pe rcen t  market s h a r e  s t i l l  dominates t he  U.S. a u t o  market .  Ford and Chrys l e r ,  
however, a r e  s l i p p i n g ,  wh i l e  Toyota and Datsun a r e  ga in ing .  S t i l l  t h e  i n c r e a s e  
i n  s a l e s  of 60,695 u n i t s  by Toyota and 45,158 u n i t s  by Datsun du r ing  t h e  f i r s t  
h a l f  of 1980 (compared t o  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of 1979) does n o t  e x p l a i n  t h e  dec rease  
i n  s a l e s  of 392,218 u n i t s  by Ford and 195,473 u n i t s  by Chrys le r .  
While import compet i t ion  con t inues  t o  erode s a l e s  of domes t i ca l l y  produced 
c a r s ,  D e t r o i t  ha s  been h i t  even ha rde r  by t h e  r e c e n t  g a s o l i n e  s h o r t a g e ,  s o a r i n g  
g a s o l i n e  p r i c e s ,  t h e  r i s i n g  c o s t  of ope ra t i ng  a  c a r ,  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  
dwindl ing consumer conf idence ,  r i s i n g  unemployment, and a l l  t h e  o t h e r  nega t ive  
influences of the recession. For Detroit, the recession could not have come 
at a more inopportune time. 
The outlook for automobile sales is for sluggish recovery as imports 
continue to account for about one fourth of the unit sales. Total U.S. 
sales should recover their 1979 level by 1982, but domestic auto employment 
may not completely recover for years to come. The reason is that Detroit's 
new generation of fuel-efficient autos requires fewer workers to assemble, 
partly because of the increased use of robots but d s o  because smaller cars 
take less work to produce. 
Mathematical Notes to Table 2-6 
Changes in market shares can be attributed to either increased sales 
by individual manufacturers or decreased total sales as follows: 
Let m = market share 
c = sales by a corporation 
s = total U.S. sales 
m = C/S 
log m = log c - log s 
d log m = d log c - d log s 
1 = d log c - d log s 
d log m d log m 
The above equation says that the total percentage change in the market 
share can be decomposed into the percentage change in corporate sales and 
the percentage change in total U.S. sales. The natural logarithm is used 
to avoid problems of discrete time periods in compounding. 
111. IMPORT RESTRICTIONS* 
A. General  Background 
The import r e s t r i c t i o n s  being proposed t a k e  e i t h e r  t h e  form of formal  
quo ta s  l i m i t i n g  t h e  number ( n o t  v a l u e )  of imported au tomobi les  o r  a  n e g o t i a t e d  
agreement w i t h  Japan t o  restrict  automotive e x p o r t s  t o  t h e  United S t a t e s .  
Whether t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  i s  admin i s t e r ed  on t h e  U.S. o r  Japanese  s i d e  
l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  terms of  i t s  impact on U.S. o u t p u t ,  employment, - 
balance  of t r a d e  ( u n l e s s  import  r i g h t s  a r e  s o l d ) .  I t  does ,  however, 
U.S. government revenues and expend i tu re s .  
The immediate economic impact of  an  import quota  on automobiles  
makes 
and 
a f f e c t  
would 
be t o  r e s t r i c t  t h e  q u a n t i t y  and c r e a t e  and a r t i f i c i a l  s h o r t a g e  of imported 
c a r s .  Th i s  s h o r t a g e  would d r i v e  up p r i c e s ,  f i r s t  f o r  imported c a r s ,  second 
f o r  d o m e s t i c a l l y  produced c a r s  d i r e c t l y  competing w i t h  impor t s ,  and t h i r d ,  
t o  a  l e s s e r  e x t e n t ,  f o r  domes t i ca l l y  produced c a r s  n o t  d i r e c t l y  competing 
wi th  impor t s .  The quota  would, c o u r s e ,  reduce s a l e s  of impor t s  and would 
tend  t o  i n c r e a s e  s a l e s  of  domes t i ca l l y  produced automobiles .  
The h ighe r  p r i c e s  f o r  imported c a r s  would r e f l e c t  o n l y  a n  a r t i f i c i a l  
s c a r c i t y  and n o t  i nc reased  c o s t s  of  product ion.  Higher p r o f i t s  pe r  u n i t ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  would acc rue  t o  bo th  domest ic  and f o r e i g n  producers  s e l l i n g  i n  
t h e  United S t a t e s .  
The groups i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  who would g a i n  from an import r e s t r i c t i o n  
on a u t o s  would be t h e  domest ic  automobile  producers  p l u s  t h e i r  employees, 
s u p p l i e r s ,  and r e t a i l e r s .  The groups who would l o s e  would be t h e  r e t a i l e r s  
and s u p p l i e r s  of t h e  imported automobile  i n d u s t r y  p l u s  consumers of  both 
imported and domest ic  automobiles .  Consumers would f a c e  h ighe r  p r i c e s  and 
* By Dick K .  Nanto, Analyst  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Trade and Finance.  
fewer choices in the automotive market. In essence, an import restriction 
on automobiles is equivalent to transferring income from all consumers and 
the imported auto industry to the domestic auto industry. 
Economy wide, even though the immediate effect of import restrictions is 
to increase both employment and GNP, when possible retaliation by other countries 
and reduced U.S. exports are taken into account, total U.S. employment and 
GNP could fall. The highly restrictive Smoot-Hawley tariff in the early 1930s 
is a classic case in point. 
A weakness of import restrictions is that they do not discriminate in 
their effect. The largest financial gains from them would likely accrue to 
General Motors even though Ford, Chrysler, and American Motors appear to be 
the companies most injured by foreign competition. General Motors holds 
a 45 percent market share and offers a wide range of passenger cars in the 
compact and subcompact range. In 1979, for example, General Motor's Chevrolet 
Division alone sold as many passenger cars as the entire Ford Motor Company 
and nearly as many as all of the imports combined. General Motors, however, 
has not publicly endorsed the proposed import restraints. 
Even though import quotas are used by nearly all countries, they violate 
the spirit of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The Agreement 
does, however, allow for an "escape clause" by which quotas can be imposed 
to keep imports from severely disrupting domestic markets. 
The justification for import restrictions is usually couched in terms 
of increased employment in a particular industry. For expanding economy-wide 
employment, however, traditional monetary and fiscal policies are probably 
more efficient and less damaging to external economic relations. In the 
case of automobiles, however, unemployment is geographically concentrated in. 
the auto-producing States and among a group of workers many of whom do not 
have specific skills that are readily transferable to other industries. 
Monetary and fiscal policies would generally require that a sizeable proportion 
of these workers move into other industries and possibly into other States. 
In general, import restrictions tend to decrease the efficiency of an 
economy, 29/ since they encourage the misallocation of resources toward the -
protected industry. In the case of automobiles, however, the large number 
of unemployed workers along with low capacity utilization rates at some plants 
indicate that production could be increased without reducing the resources 
available to the rest of the economy. The increased employment in the domestic 
auto industry, however, would be off set, somewhat, by the displacement of 
workers in the imported auto industry. 
A type of "infant industry" argument can be presented in favor of auto 
import restrictions. The premise is that domestic auto producers basically 
are able to compete successfully with imports, but they need some time to 
bring out their own line of high-mileage cars. During the late l97Os, the 
American automobile industry appears to have underestimated the impact of 
the soaring petroleum prices on the demand for small cars. In a sense, they 
were-misled by a similar shift to small cars in 1973 which was transitory. 
The current shift, however, appears to be permanent. In a recent poll, 56 
percent of the owners of a full-size domestic car said they wanted a small 
one. Domestic automobile producers are in the middle of an expensive program 
to downsize their product lines, but need more time to complete it. Import 
restrictions could buy that time. 
29/ See for example, U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Staff Report on 
~ f f e c G  of Restrictions on United States Imports: Five Case Studies and 
Theory. Washington, Govt . Print. Off., 1980. 
Import restrictions could also force foreign producers to set up assembly 
plants in the United States. This would create more domestic auto industry 
employment. 
B. Proposals to Restrict Automotive Imports 
Several bills introduced into the 96th Congress would limit imports.of 
automotive products. H.R. 6645 would impose a quota on imports of automobiles, 
trucks, and specified engines of 10 percent of the annual domestic consumption 
-. 
for a five-year period beginning in 1981. H.R. 6718 would impose an annual 
quota for those foreign manufacturers selling more than 200,000 units per year 
in the United States based on their actual 1979 market share as applied to 1.5 
million units. H.R. 7803 would impose quotas on imports of automobiles, trucks 
and certain engines for a five year period. H.R. 7957 would authorize the President 
to enter into temporary agreements with foreign nations to limit the importation 
of automobiles and trucks. 
Several Congressional resolutions, both joint and concurrent, would 
call for the President to enter into negotiations with the Japanese Government 
to restrain exports of automobiles to the United States. These include House 
Concurrent Resolutions 363 and 380, House Joint Resolution 580, and Senate 
Joint Resolution 193. 
In the United Auto Workers petiti0.n to the International Trade Commission, 
one of the measures requested is a formal import quota based either on the 
1976 import level of 1.71 million new passenger cars or on the smaller 1975 
import level of 1.34 million cars. 30/ -
30/ See U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. 
The ~ z t e d  Auto Workers Petition for Relief From Import Competition in 
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IV. THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON AUTOMOBILES: 
ECONOMETRIC SIMULATIONS* 
This section will provide some basic information on the likely macroeconomic 
consequences of a policy imposing import quotas on automobiles under alternative 
assumptions as to the extent of the response of domestic auto productipn to such 
a policy. 
The probable qualitative and quantitative macroeconomic impact of a policy 
to restrict automobile imports can be determined through the use of a large-scale 
econometric model of the U.S. economy. By reducing the assumed magnitude of auto 
imports in the model to the proposed level of restriction, it is possible to trace 
through the repercussions of this change on a variety of macroeconomic performance 
characteristics such as GNP, employment, Government expeditures, and the balance 
of payments over the next few years. The results of such an exercise are reported 
here. 
The Data Resources Inc. (DRI) macro-econometric model is used to simulate 
the national economic response to the imposition of import quotas on automobiles. 
Specifically, it is assumed that auto imports are held to 1.7 million units (the 
1976 level) for the period beginning in the third quarter of 1980 and ending in the 
fourth quarter of 1982. 
In the DRI model the structure of the "unit auto sales" equation is such 
that any reduction in imported automobile sales causes an offsetting increase 
in domestic auto sales. The model's assumption is that the total demand for 
autos is not affected by the foreign-domestic product mix. This production 
response pattern, however, may not be very realistic. Limited domestic production 
capacity for small fuel efficient cars may preclude any sizable increase in 
*By Craig K. Elwell. Analyst in Econometrics 
domestic small car output in the near term. Some increased production of large 
domestic cars for which significant production capacity does exist may result. 
But on balance, the current situation in the auto industry indicates a domestic 
production response to import quotas that is far less than the one-for-one tradeoff 
implicit in the unadjusted DRI model structure would be more appropriate. At 
present, however, there exists no uncontested opinion as to what the domestic 
production response would be. For that reason, three alternative domestic production 
- 
responses to imposition of an import quota will be structured into the DRI model 
and the macroeconomic performance of the economy examined in each of the three 
cases. 
A. Constructing Three Alternative Simulations 
The three alternative import quota simulations are developed from the July 
1980 control solution of the DRI model named CONTROL 072280. This model solution 
represents DRI's most probable forecast as to the likely direction of the macro- 
economy through 1982. The three import quota simulations were developed from the 
control solution in the following way. First, the unit sales of foreign automobiles 
was reduced to an annual rate of 1.7 million units for the entire solution interval. 
This change is the same in all three alternatives. Compared to the control solution 
this leads to a reduction in expected unit imported car sales of 300,000 units 
in 1980, 800,000 units in 1981, and 900,000 units in 1982. Second, the unit 
sales of domestic automobiles were changed to reflect three possible responses 
to the import quota. The first alternative assumes a strong production and sales 
response of one-for-one sales shift from foreign sales to domestic sales. The 
second assumes a moderate response with domestic sales increasing approximately 
one-half the change in the first case. The third assumes a weak production response 
with domestic sales increasing only 100,000 units. - 31/ Thus, three separate 
simulations were developed, all alike in the extent of import restriction, but 
different as to the domestic automobile production response. 
B. Simulation Results 
Alternative 1. Strong Response. As Table 4-1 reveals, in this simulation 
domestic auto sales and production increase (approximately) one-for-one with 
the assumed import restriction (the ultimate increase is somewhat greater because - 
of the positive indirect effect on vehicle sales of rising income that results 
from increased domestic production). It is not surprising that in this alternative 
there is a strong increase in industrial production in the auto industry (up 
over 12 percent in 1981 and 1982) compared to the control solution and in turn 
an increase of employment in the tranportation equipment industry between 50 
and 60 thousand workers over the interval between 1980 and 1982. 
Table 4-2 presents the macroeconomic effects of this outcome in comparison 
to the control solution. By 1982, real GNP increases by better than one half 
percent over the control; economy-wide employment is up 300,000 workers, and 
the unemployment rate down by two tenths of a percentage point. The most sizable 
impact, not surprisingly, is on the balance of payments with large reductions 
in the payments deficit (on each of the major bases). A further result, also 
revealed in Table 4-2 is a significant reduction in the budget deficits (or 
increase in the surplus) of the Federal, State and local Governments. This 
improvement results from increased tax receipts that accompany increased personal 
and corporate income and reduced expenditures for unemployment benefits that 
occur in this simulation. 
311 This domestic production response is consistent with estimates made 
recenxy by the President's Council of Economic Advisors. See footnote 9. 
The DRI simulations show no significant increase in the price level mainly 
because of the way the model is structured. The model does not account for excess 
demand for small cars. It assumes that the drop in imported car sales stems from a 
fall in demand and not import quotas. Any price effects in the model, therefore, 
arise from excess demand economy-wide and not within the automobile market. The 
direct impact of import quotas on the rate of inflation, therefore, cannot real- 
istically be estimated by the DRI model. 
TABLE 4-1. Case 1: Strong Domestic Product ion Response, I n d u s t r y  E f f e c t s  
Key: A = Case 1, B = Cont ro l ,  D = . A  - B ,  % = D/R * 100. 
Imported Car Sa le s  (Units) .  
-. 
Domestic Car Sa l e s  ( U n i t s )  
T o t a l  U.S. Car S a l e s  (Un i t s )  
I n d u s t r i a l  Product ion ,  Autos ( Index)  
Employment, T ranspor t a t ion  Indus t ry  (Mi l l i ons )  
TABLE 4-2. Case 1: Strong Domestic Production Response, Macroeconomic Effects 
Key: A = Case 1, B = Control, D = A -B, % = D/B * 100. 
Real GNP (1972 $.) 
Consumption Price Deflator (Index) 
Employment (Millions) 
Unemployment (Rate) 
Net Exports (Exports-Imports $ )  
TABLE 4-2. Case I: Strong Domestic Production Response, Macroeconomic Effects 
(continued) 
Key: A - Case 1, B = Control, D = A - B, % = D/B * 100. 
Balance of Payments, Current Account 
Balance of Payments, Merchandise Account 
Federal Government Budget Deficits (-) 
State and Local Government Budget Deficits 
National Demand for Energy (Quadrillion BTU) 
Alternative 2. Moderate Response. This simulation incorporates a more moderate 
domestic production and sales increase approximately amounting to one-half.the 
number of imports eliminated. The results show industrial production in autos 
would increase by about 5 percent by 1982 and sector-wide employment would 
increase by about 25,000 persons above the resultof the control solution. 
The broader macroeconomic effects are presented in Table 4-4. Qualitatively 
the macroeconomic results for GNP and employment are similar to Alternative 
1, but, as would be expected, the magnitude of changes that occur in this case 
are significantly smaller. Real GNP is up 3 to 4 tenths of a percentage point, 
and employment economy-wide is up 100,000 workers. The balance of payments con- 
tinues to exhibit significant improvement. 
The simulations show a small reduction (0.2 to 0.3 percent) in the rate of 
inflation. This is unrealistic and occurs because in this alternative domestic 
sales do not increase by the equal amount that imports are decreased. The model 
assumes there is a net reduction in the total demand for autos which in turn 
takes some upward pressure off of the price level. 
Alternative 3. Weak response. In this final simulation domestic automobile 
production is allowed to increase by a small 100,000 units. The industry's 
specific results are presented in Table 4-5 and the macroeconomic results in 
Table 6. Again, the import quota leads to substantial improvement in the balance 
of payments, but the greatly reduced domestic production response in this 
simulation greatly reduces the impact on real output (real GNP) employment, 
and Government budget deficits. The average increase of 100,000 units of domestic 
sales pushes up real GNP no more than 0.2%. Employment economy wide increases 
by about 100,000 persons in 1981. As in the previous case the price effects 
are unrealistic. 
Again the model assumes the net reduction in the demand for automobiles leads 
to moderate deceleration of the rate of climb of the price level as measured 
by the consumption component of the GNP price deflator. 
TABLE 4-4. Case 2: Moderate Domestic Production Response, Macroeconomic Effects 
Key: A =  Case 2, B = Control, D = A -  B, % = D / B  * 100. 
Real GNP (1972 $)  
Consumption Price Deflator (Index) 
-. 
1980 198 1 1982 
Employment (Millions) 
Unemployment (Rate) 
Net Exports ( $  Exports - $ Imports) 

TABLE 4 - 3 .  Case 2: Moderate Domestic Production Responses, Industry Effects. 
Key: A = Case 2, B = Control, D = A - By % = D/B * 100. 
Imported Car Sales (Units) 
Domestic Car Sales (Units) 
1980 198 1 1982 
Total U.S. Car Sales (Units) 
Industrial Production, Autos (Index) 
Employment, Transportation Equipment (Millions) 
TABLE 4-5. Case 3: Weak Domestic Production Response, Industry Effects 
Key: A = Case 3, B = Control, D = A - B, % = D/B * 100. 
Imported Car Sales (Units) 
Domestic Car Sales (Units) 
Total U.S. Car Sales (Units) 
Industrial Production, Autos (Index) 
Employment Transportation Equipment Industry (Millions) 

TABLE 4-6. Case 3: Weak Domestic Production Response, Macroeconomic Effects 
(continued) 
Key: A = Case 3, B = Control, D= A - B, % = D/B * 100. 
Balance of Payments, Current Account 
Balance of Payments, Merchandise Account 
.. . 
1980 1981 1982 
Federal Government Budget Deficit 
State and Local Government Deficit 
National Demand for Energy (Quadrillion BTU) 
C.  Conclusion (Sec t ion  I V )  
Beyond t h e  improvement i n  t h e  ba lance  of payments o t h e r  f avo rab le  macro- 
economic e f f e c t s  on ou tpu t  and employment depend c r i t i c a l l y  on what t h e  a c t u a l  
domestic product ion  and s a l e s  response would be t o  t h e  impos i t ion  of a n  a u t o  
import quota.  
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